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1. Banking system development in Kazakstan 
The Kazakstani banking system, its youthfulness notwithstanding, is developing 
rapidly. In 1987 before the initiation of economic reforms, the banking system of 
Kazakstan was represented by two banks: the Gosbank (State Bank) and Stroibank 
(Construction Bank). In 1987 three sector banks were created based on the Stroibank: 
Promstroi Bank (now Turan Bank), Agroprom Bank (Agricultural Industry Bank), and 
Zhilstroi Bank (Housing Construction Bank). In early 1990 a branch of the USSR 
Vnesheconombank (Foreign Trade Bank) was created in Kazakstan. Upon its estab-
lishment, Kazakstani banks started for the first time to serve foreign trade transactions 
(earlier foreign trade was fully centralized in Moscow).  
By the middle of 1994, 230 banks had already been created. During the recent 
fourteen months, a process of reduction in the number of banks has become evident. 
Significant changes in the number of banks are shown in Table 1. The number of 
banks has decreased by 32 per cent, from 191 to 130. This reduction is more evident in 
the private banks ￿ their number reduced by 43 per cent from 56 to 32 ￿ and in 
commercial banks (reduced from 16 in September 1994 to one in November 1995). 
The number of joint stock banks shrank by 21 per cent (Statistical Bulletin 1991-
1996).  
It can be said that during the last five years, the banking system of Kazakstan un-
derwent rapid growth and expansion (1991 ￿ mid 1994); then it experienced crisis, 
assets’ reduction, and fast consolidation (mid 1994 to present). 
An avalanche of bank creation and initiation was registered in 1992-1993. The 
liberal licensing policy ￿ low charter capital requirements and almost no professional 
requirements for managers of newly created banks ￿ facilitated the process. To a cer-
tain extent, the process was accompanied by a criminalization of the banking business 
and an accompanying discredit in the eyes of the broad public.  
National law also affected the rapid growth of banks. Before mid-1994, opening 
a bank could be compared in Kazakstan to establishing a private enterprise or a 
partnership. Since every bank could share in credit resources, there was no lack of 
desire to open banks. Moreover, every self-respecting businessman deemed it 
necessary to have his own bank.  
This practice was successfully stopped by the National Bank (NB) of Kazakstan 
with the introduction of stricter requirements for opening banks. Particularly important 
changes took place in April and September 1994. In April 1994 in order to open a 
bank, charter capital registration in the amount equivalent to USD 500,000 became 
necessary. In September 1994 in order to improve the banks’ equity liquidity, the 
requirements for the charter capital structure in second tier banks were made stricter. 
The amount of USD 1.5 million is the minimum charter capital necessary to obtain a 
license for carrying out foreign currency transactions (except operating cash currency 
exchange counters), to take money deposits from the population, or to obtain a permit W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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to open a branch. Also, rules were introduced for charter capital payment in reliable 
funds. 
As a result of all these changes, two tier banking system has been developed in 
Kazakstan. The National Bank is the central bank of the country and constitutes the 
upper level of the banking system. All other banks constitute the lower tier.  
Second tier commercial banks can be divided into deposit and investment ones. 
The deposit banks are prohibited from participating in the equity of legal entities that 
carry out activities in manufacturing, trade, insurance, and those activities intended to 
gain profit. The law restricts the banks’ right to exercise direct influence over enter-
prises’ management through buy-out of the any interest as is practiced in Japan, 
Germany, and recently in Russia. 
Second-tier banks may be created on the basis of any form of ownership. The 
state is liable for the state-owned banks’ obligations within the funds invested in their 
charter capital. The government may, by an individual decision, assume and assign 
additional responsibility to state-owned banks. The state guarantees the deposits ac-
cepted by interstate banks from Republic of Kazakstan (RK) residents and is liable for 
the banks’ obligations proportionally to the governmental share in their charter capital. 
As for other types of banks, the state is not liable for their obligations nor are banks 
liable for governmental obligations except in cases when the banks or the government 
assume such liability. 
Bank founders and shareholders can include legal entities and individuals ￿ 
Kazakstani residents and non-residents if the latter are not registered in an off-shore 
zone. No one bank founder can dispose and (or) manage more than 25 per cent of the 
bank’s voting shares. This difference in share ownership rules for corporations and 
banks reflects a banks’ peculiarity: the management of other people’s money. 
At the end of 1995, the banking system of the Republic of Kazakstan consisted 
of 130 commercial banks and included six groups of banks: state-owned, interstate, 
joint stock banks with partial state participation, private, foreign, and joint banks (see 
Table 1). 
The state owned banks include the Exim Bank (crediting of efficient investment 
projects), the Rehabilitation Bank (financial rehabilitation of large industrial enter-
prises), and the People’s Bank (accumulation of money from the population). These 
banks perform certain specific functions that correspond to the needs and objectives of 
the state. Usually such banks provide medium- and long-term credits and sector-ori-
ented loans.  
The interstate banks are banks which operate in many countries. In Kazakstan, 
only the Central Asian Bank of Reconstruction and Development was present with a 
very marginal role. 
The joint stock banks include former state-owned banks, like the Alem Bank, 
Turan Bank, Credsoc Bank, and Agroprom Bank. Their characteristics are an initially 
high level of assets in the balance, a high level of problematic loan portfolio because 
of their state origin, and apparent conservatism. 
The private banks consist of new dynamic large banks, and small ones which 
have insignificant roles. The new dynamic banks include the Kazcommerts Bank, 
Center Bank, Nefte (Oil) Bank and Temir Bank. Their characteristics are a relatively The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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long history in Kazakstani conditions (3 to 4 years) and increased activities in new 
segments of the financial market. 
A total of six foreign banks are operating in Kazakstan. They include the 
Commercial Industrial Bank of China, the Bank of China, a subsidiary of the Dutch 
Bank ABN-Amro Bank Kazakstan, Kazakstan International Bank, branch of the 
Russian Alfa Bank, TexaKa Bank. Though comparatively numerous, this group does 
not play any important role like attracting foreign investment. Foreign banks try to 
penetrate the Kazakstani financial market; however, the National Bank allows only 
foreign banks with a high rating according to one of the rating agencies (Moodys, 
Standard and Poor, IBCA) to create subsidiary banks. Also, the banks are restricted in 
the share of foreign participation for 1995-1997. The total registered charter capital of 
the banks with foreign participation cannot exceed 25 per cent of the total registered 
charter capital of all the banks in the Republic of Kazakstan. 
Seven joint banks include the Kazakstan-Turkish, Albaraka-Kazakstan, the KZI 
Bank, and others.  
The number of banks in Kazakstan is undoubtedly too large. Poland, for 
example, where the population is 2.5 times more than that of Kazakstan, has 90 banks, 
Hungary 31, the Czech Republic 18. Consolidation of the banks seems necessary, and 
the newly amended version of the Provision on Liquidation of Banks promotes the 
process of consolidation. Under the Provision, after the National Bank Executive 
Board decides to liquidate a bank, the oblast department of the National Bank creates a 
special liquidation commission. The commission forms so-called liquidated assets and 
collects claims. Afterwards, it satisfies creditors’ claims ￿ bank depositors and clients 
￿ in accordance with the Provision which, as a matter of principle, stipulates the 
priority for satisfying the claims of individual depositors. Then and only then are the 
claims of the state budget and legal entities satisfied. 
According to the National Bank, 62 banks in Kazakstan are presently being liqui-
dated, and for six of them the liquidation process has been completed. The National 
Bank established a special organizational unit to tackle these issues, the Department of 
Control over Liquidation Process, which was separated from the Bank Supervision 
Department. 
In our opinion, the speed of the banks’ consolidation process in Kazakstan should 
be accelerated. However, consolidation should be initiated at the lower level, and the 
banks’ supervision should facilitate the process. It is also necessary to limit trends 
toward banking services being monopolized by large banks if the process of bank 
mergers, acquisitions, and expansion is not accompanied by a better quality of 
provided services and interest rate reduction. 
Of the 130 registered banks, only 48 acquired licenses for foreign currency trans-
actions, and only 37 obtained general licenses (see Table 2). The actual total charter 
capital amounts to USD 133.3 million which averages 1 million per bank, a very low 
amount compared to international standards. 
Table 2 shows that the majority of commercial banks do not possess sufficiently 
large charter capital. The smallest banks possess a charter capital of T 1 million (USD 
16.6 thousand), and the largest over T 130 million (USD 2 million). At the end of 
1995, only three banks in the republic (Exim Bank, KRAMDS Bank, and ABN-Amro 
Bank) had charter capital of over USD 10 million, and two banks (Alem Bank and W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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Turan Bank) had charter capital between USD 5 and 10 million. By comparison, an 
average bank in Poland (which lags behind the developed Western countries in the 
development of a banking system) has a charter capital 1.5 times larger than the 
charter capital of any of the three largest banks in Kazakstan.  
The limited size of charter capital hinders the expansion of banking transactions 
and the banks’ positive influence on the real economy. Therefore, further development 
and consolidation of the country’s banking system are necessary. Table 3 also shows 
that during the last three months, there were no radical changes in the charter capital 
structure. 
The number of branches is between 1,010 and 1,050 which is on the average 7.8 
per bank. Though the number of banks is too large, the number of branches is appar-
ently insufficient. Let’s consider for comparison the density of branches in Western 
countries (according to applicable international standards, the density is determined as 
the number of population per one bank branch). There are 717 people per branch in 
Belgium, 835 in Switzerland, 1,000 in Germany, 1,314 in France, 1,331 in the UK, 
and 1,780 in Japan. The most ￿backward￿ country is the USA which has 2,214 people 
served per branch. Of course, the authors do not take into account the numerous firms, 
trade organizations and other companies that are allowed by law to carry out some 
banking transactions. In Russia the population per branch ratio is 3,100 which is more 
than 1.4 times larger than in the USA. 
In Kazakstan the density is 15,952, persons per one branch, a very low saturation 
of banking facilities. Moreover, if we exclude the banking structures located in 
Almaty, the bank density in the rest of the territory is much lower. Also, the 
concentration of branches is extremely uneven. Two banks possess the majority of 
branches: the People’s Bank of Kazakstan has 28.4 per cent of the branches (296) and 
the Agroprom Bank 22.5 per cent (235) (see Table 2). 
The authors believe that it is necessary to liberalize the procedure for obtaining 
branch opening permits. For instance, the relevant charter capital requirement could be 
reduced from USD 1.5 million to 1 million. A marketing analysis of demand for bank-
ing services in different regions of the republic is also necessary in order to evaluate 
the optimum size for banks capable of satisfying the demand and bearing the 
minimum costs of potential clients’ service. 
Specialized banks still play a very important role in the Kazakstani economy. 
The People’s Bank, the Alem Bank, the Turan Bank, the Exim Bank, the Zhilstroi 
Bank and the Rehabilitation Bank are regarded as specialized. 
The People's Bank (joint-stock savings banks with 100 per cent state participa-
tion) has an extensive branch network of 296 branches all over the country, and it 
specializes in deposit taking and providing other services to the population. Its 
deposits are state-guaranteed, and the Bank is not yet subject to the National Bank’s 
prudential regulations. Its stage-by-stage privatization is planned. 
The Alem Bank created by the 31 August 1992 Decree of the RK President ac-
quired a leading position within a very short time, and it gained international recogni-
tion as early as 1992. It became the first bank in the country to introduce such interna-
tional banking systems as SWIFT, REUTERS, VISA INTERNATIONAL, EUROPE 
CARD, etc. It also owns the first banking card called ALEMCARD and the first street 
banking machines for cash payment, an automatic teller machine (ATM). The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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The Alem Bank was the first in the country’s history to attract and service foreign 
loans on behalf of and on the orders of the government. In 1994 it accounted for half 
of all foreign trade banking transactions. The Alem Bank lost its leading position in 
July 1995 when the National Bank together with the government closed it for two 
weeks and announced the bank’s bankruptcy over the official TV Channel. This action 
resulted in deterioration of its banking activities, and it also shows the political risk 
associated with banking activities in Kazakstan. 
The Turan Bank, formerly a branch of the Soviet Promstroi Bank, is now a uni-
versal joint-stock bank with 83 branches and a charter capital exceeding T 200 million 
(USD 6.6 million). The Kazakstani industrial enterprises account for more than 80 per 
cent of its credit resources. 
The Exim Bank was created by the President’s Decree in July 1994 on the basis 
of the state share in the Alem Bank’s charter capital and profit. Within three months 
governmental credit lines were transferred to the Exim Bank for servicing. In February 
1995, for the first time in Kazakstani history, the Government of Switzerland opened a 
medium-term credit line against a guarantee of the Exim Bank itself without govern-
mental participation. In August 1995, the President’s Decree transferred all functions 
of the Development Bank which had been operating for about a year to the Exim 
Bank. The Development Bank was liquidated. The Exim Bank’s mandate includes 
long-term crediting of efficient investment projects, funding of exports, insurance and 
guarantees for export loans, foreign investments, and foreign trade support projects 
(Postanovlenie 2.03.96). 
The Zhilstroi Bank which was created at the end of 1993 has 14 branches. Its 
main functions include crediting construction through a system of commercial 
construction companies, creating a system of individual housing savings accounts, and 
establishing a system of mortgage loans. In the banking services market, this bank 
supplies such products as beneficial housing loans, credits for construction programs, 
a housing lottery, etc. 
The Rehabilitation Bank was created on 29 March 1995 to deal with the finan-
cial rehabilitation of large industrial enterprises (Ustav No. 591). The Rehabilitation 
Bank supports activities of unprofitable enterprises by extending credits, and it 
finances the restructuring procedures for the largest industrial enterprises of the 
republic. The money for industrial enterprises’ reconstruction and for closing projects 
is channeled through this bank. Its major tasks are to reduce the second-tier banks’ risk 
from non-payment and to facilitate industrial enterprises ￿ debtors’ access to credit 
resources. 
In financial markets which are not fully developed and which can offer only a 
limited number of financial instruments, certain groups of borrowers may have no 
access to the market. These are the small and medium scale industries, housing con-
struction, export and import, and enterprises in a poor financial situation, etc. 
Specialized state-owned financial institutions such as the Zhilstroi Bank, Exim Bank, 
and Rehabilitation Bank have usually filled the gap. 
Because of imperfect risk assessment and the drawbacks of the market, develop-
ment of specialized financial institutions with state assistance is justified, and many 
post-communist countries created such banks in order to resolve transitional tasks. The 
problem is that the subsidized loans and bad management of such institutions very W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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often generate high costs to taxpayers. An apparent example is the Polish BGﬂ which 
funds the agricultural industry.  
For this reason, all specialized banks must perform their functions temporarily. 
When the banking services market is developed, the specialized banks should be trans-
formed into universal ones. 
2. Role of the National Bank 
On currency, drafts and implements with the cooperation of the Ministry of 
Finance the 30 March 1995 the President’s Decree having the force of law on the 
National Bank (NB) of the Republic of Kazakstan was issued (Ukaz 3.03.95). The NB 
is the central bank and forms the upper level of the banking system. The National 
Bank, according to the President’s Decree ensures the internal and external stability of 
the national currency, drafts and implements the state monetary policy with the 
cooperation of the Ministry of Finance and protects the interests of bank depositors 
and creditors. The Decree provides for direct reporting of the National Bank to the 
President and a necessary independence of the National Bank from the current 
governmental agenda. 
The main goal of the monetary and credit policy is control over the money 
supply and suppression of inflation. The National Bank uses the following classic 
monetary and credit tools: 
￿  regulation of refinance credit amounts provided by the NB to commercial 
banks, 
￿ basic refinance rate regulation, 
￿ mandatory reserves mechanism, 
￿ transactions with state treasury securities, 
￿ interventions in the currency market. 
The refinance rate fell along with the reduction in inflation. The 3-months credit 
rate was decreased from 176 per cent in January 1995 to 52 per cent in December. 
Since 27 March 1996, the refinance rate was 44 per cent. The National Bank tries to 
keep the refinance rate positive in real terms in order to encourage the inflow of 
private deposits to the banks. However, refinance rate reduction does not result in a 
rapid enough reduction of lending interest rates to the full extent by the banks. The 
reasons are first, their desire to gain short-term profits, and second, lack of real 
competition in the capital market. 
The level of mandatory bank reserves was reduced after 1 April 1996 from 20 to 
15 per cent. After July 1, the banks will be paid 50 per cent of the refinance rate if they 
have reserve account balances. This will allow them to expand their credit activities. 
Moreover, the banks will be able to offer depositors better interest. On the other hand, 
this action may result in an increase in the money supply and, under further industrial 
decline, to greater inflation. 
The National Bank participates actively in the securities market operation as the 
governmental agent for primary allocation and servicing of the 3- and 6-months state 
treasury bonds (STB). In the future, one-year STB are to be issued. Thus secondary The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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state securities market has been formed. The short-term NB note auctions will be 
gradually reduced as the securities market develops. Also, as the banks accumulate 
sufficient amounts of treasury bills purchased at the primary market, the system of 
lombard credits against the collateral of state securities is introduced as well as REPO 
transactions in all markets: credit, gold, and securities (Postanovlenie 31.05.1996). 
At present the NB credit interest rates are changing from the official refinance 
rate to the NB lombard credit rate. The rates of auction and interbank credits are the 
major indicators of the credit market situation. 
On 31 August 1995, the Decree on Banks and Banking Activities in the Republic 
of Kazakstan was adopted (Ukaz 1.09.95). The Decree strengthened the National Bank 
functions with regard to commercial banks: 
￿ the licensing rules are made stricter including requirements for bank founders 
￿ their financial status, charter capital formation, managers’ qualifications, and 
reputation. The business plan for the new bank received stricter requirements also; 
￿ the banks are obliged to publish annual reports, including annual balances and 
income statements by the deadline set by the National Bank after the accuracy of these 
reports being examined by certified auditors. Unfair advertising practices are also pro-
hibited; 
￿ the chairman of any bank’s executive board and his deputy, and the chief ac-
countant and his deputies are appointed (elected) upon the agreement of the National 
Bank; 
￿ the procedures for bank closing, liquidation, and reorganization were set. These 
actions are carried out under the decision or with permission of the National Bank; 
￿ for the first time, a clear definition of ￿banking secret￿ was set as well as crimi-
nal liability for its disclosure for officials, bank personnel, and other persons who, in 
performance of their duties, had access to confidential information. 
In order to ensure banks’ financial stability, protect their depositors’ interests, and 
support a stable monetary and credit system, the National Bank regulates banking 
activities, through those means: 
￿ introduction of prudential standards and other rules and limits obligatory for 
banks including reserve requirements and provisions against doubtful and loss loans; 
￿ issuance of mandatory instructions and other regulations; 
￿ completion of bank performance inspections; 
￿ drafting of recommendations for banks’ financial rehabilitation; 
￿ application of limited remedies to banks; 
￿ application of sanctions to banks. 
The prudential standards were brought in accordance with the recommendations 
of international financial institutions and the Basel Committee for Bank Supervision: 
minimum charter capital, liquidity ratio, equity adequacy ratio, maximum risk per one 
borrower, open currency position limits (Postanovlenie 29.02.96). 
The new law establishes the model of a state strictly regulated banking system 
where commercial banks are assigned the role of agents for the monetary policy 
carried out by the National Bank. The banks are obliged to submit daily balances to 
the Department of Bank Supervision under the instruction ￿On the Procedure for Data 
Submission by the Banks in RK for Calculation of Prudential (Economic) Standards.￿ 
Every month banks have to submit statements with a calculation of the equity W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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adequacy ratio and with comparative tables for assets and liabilities. Banks are fully 
responsible for the reliability of the data provided. Moreover, the NB carries out 
complex monitoring of banks’ activities in the currency exchange, bills of exchange 
auctions, and interbank markets, with a day-to-day review of their correspondent 
accounts which allows it to assess quickly and analyze the banks’ financial situation, 
identify potential problems, and undertake the necessary measures in a timely manner. 
In 1994 and 1995 the NB of Kazakstan issued about T 34.9 billion in different 
forms of centralized credits which is more than 60 per cent of its credits to commercial 
banks (see Table 4). The borrowers for this program agreed to credit length and terms 
with the government, the NB, and local authorities. In general, the banks played the 
role of passive money conduits for such credit. The majority of such funds (91 per 
cent) was provided to cover the state budget deficit and grain purchase. 
It is necessary to emphasize that the broad use of centralized loans slows down 
the process of banking sector reform since these loans do not require a development of 
activities usually related to bank crediting such as deposit and credit assessment. The 
specific credit allocation more reflects political power and the negotiation skills of the 
borrowers than economic considerations. 
The NB of Kazakstan used centralized credit programs for two purposes: to en-
sure liquidity of the banking system and to support individual enterprises and different 
industries. Unfortunately, the centralized credits are not an efficient way to achieve 
any of these goals and should be totally replaced in 1996 by the ￿discount window￿ at 
interest rates that ensures more rational credit utilization, or by credit auctions. As a 
rule, discount windows or credit auctions do not result in discrimination against any 
banks or industries as the directive credit programs do. 
The NB gradually reduces the amount of refinance credits. Since 6 February 
1995 directive credits have not been extended. They were replaced by centralized 
credits which are distributed through auctions and extended for one, two or three 
months. Provision of the six-month credits was canceled since the refinance credits are 
intended to resolve short-term liquidity problems, not to be used as a primary economy 
funding means as was practiced earlier.  
The credit auctions procedure, however, is more complicated than the ￿discount 
window￿. Bid transmission from the banks is technically difficult and deprives small 
and distant banks of participation opportunities. Besides the procedure takes much 
time since the NB has to assess the bids and to ensure that there is no secret agreement 
between banks. And, last but not least, collateral is necessary. In developed countries, 
only state securities can serve as collateral. In Kazakstan this is practically impossible. 
Therefore, the NB could allow banks to use some types of commercial loans as collat-
eral during a transitional period. 
 In the transitional economy with its weak and underdeveloped banking system, 
the NB’s interference is necessary as a financial markets’ organizer. During 1994 the 
organized interbank currency market successfully formed. Since the first quarter of 
1995, primary and secondary state securities markets and an interbank money market 
started to form. In December 1994 the NB Executive Board approved the Provision on 
Transactions for On-call Loans Provision and Repayment: on-call loans are interbank 
credits extended for a period under 30 days. Based on the results of the daily interbank 
short-term credit auctions, the average interest rate in December 1995 fluctuated be-The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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tween 39 per cent for one-day T 60 million loan and 68 per cent for 30-day T 100 mil-
lion loans. The players in this market include only large and reliable banks, and they 
are subject to certain checks by the NB so that the money can be written off the banks’ 
correspondent accounts unconditionally. 
In the first quarter of 1996, the NB drafted the Law on Currency Regulation. The 
major objective of the new version is further currency market liberalization.  
Only the second-tier commercial banks that have complied with the NB 
economic rules and standards during the previous period are allowed to participate in 
the NB credit auctions which are organized no less than twice a month. The 
introduction of the lombard credit system is planned; the NB will extend loans to 
commercial banks against the collateral in the form of securities, particularly treasury 
bonds. 
In 1995 the precious metals’ market started to operate. It allows local commercial 
banks to purchase precious metals from Kazakstani producers, to sell them, or to per-
form other transactions. At present, seven banks have acquired NB licenses for 
precious metals’ transactions. 
The commercial banks are also active in the market of state treasury bonds and 
short-term NB notes. In the majority of auctions, the demand exceeds supply greatly 
regardless of the constantly reducing income rate. The reason is the high reliability and 
liquidity of state securities. 
The banking system’s development was affected by a reduction in the centralized 
NB credit amount and the inflation rate. The banks lost a source of income in the cen-
tralized risk-free credits and started to earn profit ardently on their own money or 
money acquired through the auctions at a really positive interest rate. (Earlier, due to 
inflation, the interest rate was really negative.) Stricter NB reserves requirements, as-
sets, liabilities and risk management, and numerous precedents of license revocation, 
bank closing, and liquidation urged banks to change their behavior. They began to 
realize the impossibility of activities based on the high risk for themselves and their 
clients. They started to diversify services in different financial markets including the 
market for regional debt obligations. 
3. Bank supervision  
The reform of the Kazakstani economy requires improvement in the control 
function of bank supervision. The improvement of bank supervision should be aimed 
at creating favorable conditions for stable performance of the banking system, at 
implementing its function as a financial intermediary and conductor of monetary 
policy signals, and also at preserving the public trust in banks. 
In 1995 regulatory practice was aimed at complying commercial banks’ proce-
dures with safe conduct standards, at creating incentives and conditions for internal 
reorganization of banks, at forming reliable internal auditing systems, at finding suffi-
cient resources, and implementing a sound credit and liquidity policy. These efforts 
showed the real picture of the banks’ financial situation but also led to a significant 
improvement. For instance, in early 1995 more than 65 per cent of the banks violated W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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economic standards, but by the end of the year this per cent reduced to 52 per cent. 
Analysis of inspection results carried out by the bank supervision found that banks and 
branches commit, as a rule, violations in procedures for formation and increase of the 
charter capital, in procedures for crediting, in rules for carrying out foreign currency 
transactions (e. g. the timely sale of export foreign currency proceeds at the currency 
exchange, contract payments on behalf of third parties, and charges for commission 
and penalties in foreign currency), as well as in time limits and rules of cash 
transactions. Also in 1995 the Executive Board of the National Bank revoked permits 
for opening banks and annulled licenses for the banking transactions of 45 banks for 
violation of established banking laws. Sixty-two banks are in the process of 
liquidation. The liquidation process was completed in six banks. 
These achievements, though very significant, still require additional measures. 
For instance, adoption of a resolution by the government for the National Bank on 
accounting standards, wide introduction of the new accounting system, and adoption 
of a complete set of accounting standards which will largely correspond to the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) are required (Programma, 17.05.96).  
 Presently in Kazakstan, the introduction of the new accounting system is under 
way. The system has already been introduced in the National Bank and will be estab-
lished in commercial banks in the second quarter of 1996. The system of mutual set-
tlements (clearing) is being improved, and an intermediary system has been completed 
which will serve as a basis for the long-term payments system. Adoption of interna-
tional standards for preparing reports on auditing second-tier banks will allow the 
bank supervision to improve. 
Bank supervision reform is the most crucial factor in reforming the system in 
general. For reforming this system it is necessary to carry out (a) introduction of 
international standards, (b) introduction of new equity calculation procedures and 
standards, (c) real evaluation of banks’ capitalization level and their susceptibility to 
risks, (d) presentation by commercial banks of action plans for recapitalization with 
regular reports on their implementation to the National Bank. 
4. The strategy adopted by the National Bank for recovery 
of the commercial banks 
On 17 May 1996 the National Bank adopted the strategy of a gradual and largely 
voluntary approach to banking reform providing incentives for the banks to improve 
their standards and submit to stricter supervision (Programma, 02.96). These 
incentives, according to the NB expectations, should lead to a continuous increase in 
better banks and their market share. The concept was developed with the cooperation 
of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development and resembles the 
International Standard Bank program developed by the World Bank for the Central 
Bank in Russia (Postanovlenie 18.06.1996).  
The Kazakstani National Bank strategy has the following inter-related objectives 
to be phased in over the next three years: 
￿ create a core of banks which will follow better banking practices than the rest; The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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￿ gradually raise the level of soundness of the Kazakstani banking system, which 
will occur as the number of banks taking part in the program increase; 
￿ provide the public with information to recognize the most appropriate banks 
for their specific needs (see Table 5). 
The banks can take part in he program that until 1 July 1996 (regional banks until 
1 October 1996) prepare a recapitalization and activity improvement plan and describe 
steps they will undertake to achieve the assumed standards (see Table 5). 
The benefits package is designated to produce the ￿right￿ number of banks: 
enough to form the core of a good banking system but not so many that the National 
Bank cannot supervise them effectively. The recapitalized banks with an accepted 
improvement plan by the National Bank will be allowed to possess a stake in the 
equity of investment banks, accept deposits from physical persons, take part in the 
credit auctions organized by the National Bank, pursue international operations, 
distribute international credits guaranteed by the state, issue bonds, letters of credits, 
certificate deposits, cheques, and serve as an underwriter of public offerings of 
corporate securities. The banks with an unacceptable plan will be deprived of these 
privileges. 
 It can be expected that twenty to thirty commercial banks will meet the set of 
standards and will strengthen their balance sheets and their banking skills as well as 
reduce their single borrower, connected party and in-house exposure. The number and 
market share of these banks will gradually increase, especially in those markets where 
the program provides an advantage such as dealing with household deposits and with 
foreigners.  
There are, however, two main ways in which the program may fail to produce an 
overall improvement in the banking system. 
First, the benefits of the program may fail to attract a sufficient number of banks, 
or the advantages granted to those banks may not be enough to prompt a substantial 
increase in their market share. 
Second, the banks not participating in the program may behave in ways that 
worsen their own performance, as well as that of the whole banking system, by raising 
interest rates to a point that complicates the whole operation of the ￿good￿ banks or by 
lowering credit standards in lending.  
In order to avoid these problems, the National Bank of Kazakstan should direct 
part of its supervisory capacity to those banks not participating in the program which 
continue to grow after introduction of the program.  
5. Credits and deposits structure 
Banks now provide loans to enterprises and organizations, consumer credit to in-
dividuals (in Kazakstan mostly bank staff, so called in-house lending), interbank loans, 
loans for purchase of securities, and loans for currency transactions. 
For instance, based on their audit results, the People’s Bank has the following 
credit portfolio structure: state securities account for more than half; a fairly large 
amount of funds is engaged in cash circulation because the People’s Bank is the largest W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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retail currency exchange operator; a lot of credit resources go to the oil and gas 
companies; and some go to firms that conduct efficient import. 
In the Kazcommerts Bank the largest part of its credit portfolio (about 70 per 
cent) is loans to enterprises and organizations, about 20 per cent to securities, 5 per 
cent to interbank credits, and 5 per cent to currency and exchange transactions. 
In order to ensure the necessary control over and the reliability of the banks’ ac-
tivities and in accordance with the character and scale of transactions, starting from 
autumn 1995, the banks are bound to classify their extended loans and other assets, 
identifying both doubtful and loss debts and creating provisions for them. 
The loan portfolio is classified regardless of the loan date, purpose, sources, re-
payment period, and currency. The loans provided by the banks are divided according 
to quality into the following five categories: 
1. Standard loans ￿ if the repayment period is not yet over and the quality is ex-
cellent. 
2. Substandard loans ￿ related with minor risk of repayment delay up to 30 days 
and prolonged no more than once. 
3. Unsatisfactory loans ￿ where the default time is between 30 and 60 days and 
prolonged more than once. 
4. Doubtful loans ￿ where the default time is between 60 and 90 days.  
5. Loss loans which are in default for more than 90 days. 
The banks have to submit monthly reports on loan classification and reserves 
formation for the loan portfolio to the Bank Supervision Department. The reserve 
amounts and terms are determined depending upon the categories and are described in 
the NB provision. 
Banks accept fixed-time and demand deposits, deposits of legal entities and indi-
viduals, and foreign currency deposits. 
The fixed time deposits include 3-month, 6-month, 9-month, 1-3 year, 3-5 year, 
5-10 year, and over 10 year categories. All time deposits for over six months account 
together for only 55 per cent of all time deposits which shows a continuing lack of 
trust in the banking system and the high risk of long-term investments. Certainly, the 
collective bank deposit insurance system will improve trust in banks. In the near 
future, competition for the title of the best quality, most reliable, and most diversified 
bank will strengthen. 
Interest rates for fixed time deposits are, on the average, two to three times larger 
than for demand deposits and differ around 40 per cent in different banks. The most 
popular are fixed time deposits up to three months which comprise 40 per cent of the 
total time deposits or, on the average, 16 per cent of all types of deposits. Individuals’ 
deposits are almost 60 per cent of all deposits and are increasing, which is a favorable 
trend. Tenge and foreign currency individual fixed-time deposits grew by 151.8 per 
cent in 1995, demand deposits by 86.7 per cent. The largest growth rates were regis-
tered in Eastern Kazakstan Oblast, Almaty, Karaganda, and Mangystau.  
The foreign currency deposits share is growing: the average amount is USD 900. 
This shows that the population still considers dollars as the most liquid means of sav-
ing. The interest rate, taking inflation into consideration, for Tenge deposits is almost 
the same as for dollar ones. This makes the dollar deposits preferable since there is no 
risk of unfavorable exchange rate changes. In general, 1995 was the year of deposit The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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market rehabilitation due to the high reliability of banks compared to other financial 
institutions and competitive interest rates compared to other investments. 
Any bank can carry out banking activities provided that there are common rules 
for such activities and internal regulations. The latter are public information and 
cannot be held as commercial or bank secrets. The banks are obliged to provide this 
information on their clients’ demand. 
The banks draft their credit and deposit policies themselves. They can file bank-
ruptcy court suits against insolvent borrowers. There is no prescription time for banks’ 
suits against borrowers for non-compliance with credit agreement terms. Interest and 
commission rates, as well as tariffs for banking services are established by the banks 
themselves. The banks are responsible for their obligations to other banks and clients 
on the basis of the relevant contract terms. At present, there is no system of collective 
deposit insurance; therefore, many people are not eager to make their savings deposits 
in the banks. In 1995 the majority of credits (70 per cent) were funded from the enter-
prises’ deposits (T 57 billion) and only some from individual deposits (T 12 billion). 
During this time, loans provided by the commercial banks decreased almost by half, 
from T 126 to T 66 billion. 
In order to resolve the problem of confidence in the banks, it is necessary to 
establish a banking deposit insurance system. Such a system could work under the 
supervision of the Kazakstani Banking Association and could supervise the status of 
deposits. It could be funded by commercial banks through allocation of a certain share 
of profit to an appropriate fund. In Russia commercial banks have been allocating 2 
per cent of their profit to deposit insurance and bankruptcy funds for more than two 
years. Such a system could reduce the probability of a ￿domino￿ effect. 
Full deposit insurance, however, may form grounds for excessive risk-taking by 
bank managers. Therefore, differentiated forms of insurance are necessary. First, the 
insurance system should distinguish between demand deposits and other types of de-
posits, the solution adopted in Chile. The former could receive the state guarantee, and 
banks could be required to invest demand deposits into government or central bank 
securities. Other deposits would have no guarantee and bear full market risk. 
Second, insurance premiums should be differentiated according to the bank’s risk 
level. The publication of financial institutions’ credit ratings and quality of asset struc-
ture would be very helpful.  
As mentioned, the banks can establish interest rates for loans and deposits. In 
general, they pay very low rates on current accounts. That is why the enterprises keep 
only minimum account balances necessary for their operation. It is well known that 
some banks use checks and payment orders as an additional source of cheap funds. 
These instruments represent funds which are assumed as being collected, and some 
banks keep them for several days to satisfy their own needs. 
Credit interest rates differ greatly from 60 to over 100 per cent. Some banks lend 
money at interest rates lower than the real costs. This happens for a few reasons: 
First, loan demand is limited since few borrowers can provide collateral or other 
forms of security which the banks demand for market loans as opposed to directive 
and in-house lending. 
Second, borrowers are important shareholders. W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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Third, if banks increase deposit interest rates, they have to increase their spread 
which would discourage their best clients from returning them, leaving banks with a 
high risk loan portfolio. 
Fourth, because of high inertia, inflation expectations lag behind actual inflation. 
Fifth, because of money illusion, some people look at the nominal values and do 
not adjust them for inflation. 
Many banks are owned by agencies or industrial enterprises that are at the same 
time major clients of these banks. They are in fact ￿pocket banks￿ where the founders 
get benefits in the form of credits in their ￿own￿ bank. Such an ownership structure ￿ 
banks are owned largely by the enterprises ￿ helps to perpetuate the practice of con-
nected and in-house lending. 
Connected and in-house lending are severely restricted in developed countries, 
since such practices can lead to serious problems of fraud and because they can put 
both household deposits and indirectly government funds at risk. Connected or in-
house lending can also complicate any attempt to stabilize the economy and delay the 
process of restructuring the enterprise sector. This is because banks largely owned by 
enterprises continue to lend to insolvent enterprises, thus retarding the development of 
both sound enterprises and banks.  
In order to resolve this problem in Kazakstan, two provisions were adopted.  
The first one stipulates that related persons or entities cannot receive credit in an 
amount exceeding 10 per cent of the bank’s equity. The analysis carried out by the 
National Bank shows that 7.4 per cent of the banks do not comply with this limit. In 
other banks, shareholders (related persons and entities) normally use approximately 5 
per cent of the equity, i. e. half of the limit. 
The second provision concerns banks that are owned by enterprises with more 
than 50 per cent state participation. The Decree of the President on Banking Activities 
of August 1995, No. 304, prohibited enterprises with a large state participation to hold 
shares of the banks. Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance carried out an exchange of 
all such bank shares for treasury bonds and liabilities of such enterprises with the 
Ministry of Finance. Then the Government decided to sell all its shares of all banks 
within several months except a few of them (the Exim Bank, Zhilstroi, Rehabilitation, 
People’s, Agroprom, Alem, and the Central Asian Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development) which provide specialized financial services or had difficult 
circumstances that required more time for privatization. 
Under the law the banks guarantee the confidentiality of their clients’ and corre-
spondents’ deposits and accounts. On the other hand, they have to provide this confi-
dential information to investigation, tax, and customs authorities. 
The NB actions in the banking sphere may be petitioned to the court. Filing court 
suits against the NB orders does not suspend their execution. 
In general, Kazakstani banks are becoming more careful and increasingly limited 
in their means. The banking sector is not yet able to implement investment programs 
with an adequately long credit length. About eight relatively large banks possess a 
significant monopoly compared to other small and medium banks. The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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6. Problems of bad debts' restructuring in the Republic  
of Kazakstan 
The present situation in the banking sector in Kazakstan is characterized by an 
on-going accumulation of losses in individual commercial banks which leads to their 
gradual decapitalization and the deterioration of their liquidity. An acute reduction of 
inflation during the period between the middle of 1994 and the middle of 1995 
resulted in an increase in irregular loans. Data on the 16 largest banks on 1 March 
1996 (Table 9) shows that irregular loans (called ￿risk assets￿) amounted to almost 
one-third of all assets (32.2 per cent). This is much better than in the banking system 
in general where bad loans amount, according to some estimates, to about 55-60 per 
cent of all commercial banks’ portfolios. 
The financial situation shown in the consolidated balance of all banks is also 
somewhat mixed (see Nacionalnyj 1996:14-15). The capital adequacy ratio K1 (see 
Table 9) which characterizes the relation between equity and all assets is, on the aver-
age, 14.3 per cent (27 per cent in 16 largest banks), and such a level can be deemed 
normal. It is necessary to note a significant improvement compared to 1994 when this 
ratio was 7.9 per cent which is less than the minimum limit. This shows the positive 
trends in the system’s development. However, the average share of banks that did not 
comply with the capital adequacy ratio (K1) during the year was 27 per cent. 
The liquidity factor K3 that shows the relation of liquid assets to liabilities is 
0.52 higher than the required value of 0.3. This limit, however, is violated by 30 per 
cent of all banks. 
Seventeen per cent of banks violated the factor K2 in 1995 (risk size per one bor-
rower ￿ maximum limit of 25 per cent). Maximum risk per one related borrower 
(maximum 10 per cent) was violated by seven per cent of banks. 
In 1995 banks started partially to build provisions for lost and doubtful loans 
from bank profits. In 1994 such provisions did not exist. The total provisions 
amounted to T 1330 million of which T 45 million was formed for doubtful loans 
provided to legal entities and individuals. The remaining amount, T 784 million, was 
formed as reserves for covering general bank risk. Yet total provisions which amount 
to T 1330 million is far from the necessary level of provisions calculated in 
accordance with Basel standards. For example, in 16 large banks only 12.1 per cent of 
required reserves were created. One of banks formed only 2.7 per cent of all necessary 
reserves for irregular loans. 
The capital adequacy ratio suggests that provisions must be eight times larger 
than actual figures shown in the banks’ data. This points out the need for stricter bank 
supervision and more active measures to reduce the irregular loans’ share in the credit 
portfolio. 
The extremely serious character of this problem lies further in the fact that the 
banking sector is incapable of an independent resolution to its difficulties. Because of 
low inflation in Kazakstan as compared to Russia, the Russian laissez-faire approach 
to bank rehabilitation is not applicable. It is absolutely necessary to undertake urgent 
measures to place the situation under control, stabilize it, and resolve some of the W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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major problems of the financial sector so that the banks will become able to achieve 
financial strengthening and rehabilitation themselves using market instruments.  
Analysis of the consolidated income statement of all the banks confirms that the 
banks are unable to resolve the problem of bad debts. Total returns of all banks in-
creased 170 per cent which is only 0.1 per cent more than inflation. At the same time, 
costs increased 220 per cent. As a result, all commercial banks obtained a profit of 
T 8.361 million which is 110 per cent more than in 1994. This means a worsening 
from two different points of view: (1) the real value was reduced due to inflation, (2) 
profitability of all banks reduced from 30.7 per cent in 1994 to 19.4 per cent in 1995 
(Kommentarii 1996).  
This worsening resulted from an interest rate reduction which was to a significant 
extent caused by the significant reduction in the inflation rate. This also shows that the 
future possibilities of obtaining high profits are worsening. The profit reduction would 
be larger if banks had no possibility of investing in securities. It could be said that the 
securities market development allowed banks to get more income from related transac-
tions. 
The main factor which leads to an accumulation of losses is the significant 
amount of idle assets in the banks’ balance as well as a preservation of very low or 
even negative spreads in some banks. Therefore, real profit becomes impossible which 
creates prerequisites for a liquidity crisis in the financial system.  
A significant share of irregular loans in the banks’ portfolio are those given to 
state enterprises and also loans provided in the past under different decisions of the 
government. These are, in fact, direct liabilities of the state which it does not 
recognize. They result in the problem of unclear responsibility since the state blames 
state banks for the bad financial situation, and banks, in their turn, blame the 
government for bad management of enterprises and failure to fulfill commitments. The 
specific aspect of this problem is the lack of any possibility of significantly improving 
banks’ management under a partially non-market environment. All of this requires the 
government to undertake urgent measures to improve the efficiency of the state 
enterprises’ operation.  
State enterprises and state-controlled joint-stock companies accumulated bad 
debt by not paying back loans received in one or several commercial banks and by 
simultaneously obtaining new credits in other banks and servicing these latter loans 
only. Thus, these enterprises transferred their problems to commercial banks. 
Restructuring of bad debt in the Republic of Kazakstan is also complicated by 
spontaneous privatization of state-owned banks and the subsequent loss of control 
over these banks by state authorities.  
The Rehabilitation Bank established under the World Bank project can concen-
trate only on large state debtors (until now only 34 enterprises) and will not be able to 
deal with many other state enterprises with bad loans. It is necessary to undertake 
measures that would urge commercial banks to deal with restructuring of state enter-
prises that are not covered by the Rehabilitation Bank program (Polozhenie 9.11.95). 
Objective and subjective reasons for the arrears crisis can be identified. 
Macroeconomic instability, industrial decline, and lack of long-term funding and 
working capital sources for enterprises finally resulted in low solvency in economic 
entities. The subjective reason lies in the faith of borrowers who use their beneficial The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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situation as well as the inefficient work of enterprise managers who have proved 
unable to adapt to market realities and continue to act as if they were supported by the 
State Planning and State Procurement Committees. 
The arrears problem is being actively discussed in governmental, financial, and 
academic circles. Different solutions are suggested. The majority of researchers and 
practitioners agree on the need to introduce bills of exchange circulation. Being used 
as a credit and settlement instrument, the bill is used to pay for goods and abolishes 
the problem of working capital deficiency (Polozhenie 18.01.96). 
A very popular idea is to start crediting with bank promissory notes instead of 
common bills of exchange. The proponents of this solution argue that the majority of 
commercial bills of exchange will undoubtedly not comply with the minimum require-
ments of liquidity and risk that may be established by responsible financial institutions 
or other market actors. Some commercial banks, e. g. Turan Bank, are already using 
promissory notes. 
Another solution to this problem, suggested by I. Mandel and the authors of this 
report, is seen in debt-to-equity swaps where the investor who buys the debt can 
acquire the rights for the enterprise’s management or at least for a part of its assets. 
Investors usually show interest for enterprises cleared of debts. 
There is also an idea of privatizing state shares in exchange for debts 
(A. Esentukelov). However, potential investors are discouraged by the undefined real 
price of state stock which was never offered for open sale, and they do not want to 
deal with the government and the hopeless agricultural sector debts. Additionally, the 
Kazakstani law does not allow for debt-to-equity swaps during the privatization proc-
ess. 
There are also suggestions especially supported by the Association of Banks 
(Polozhenie 9.11.95) that the state pay debts of agriculture and other sectors. Others 
like some presidential advisors think that mutual arrears could be netted as an account-
ing transaction without reissuing the credit. In our opinion, without essential changes 
in the enterprise management approach, however, the probability of another arrears 
crisis still exists (D„browski et all 1996:97). 
The Law on Bankruptcy adopted on 7 April 1995, is also aimed at resolving the 
accumulated arrears problems, and at the same time it creates an important channel for 
the structural transformation of the economy (Ukaz 7.04.95). This law will allow the 
creditors to petition the court to announce a bankruptcy if the debtor does not repay on 
time. The court may order an external management of the debtor’s estate, dismiss for-
mer managers, and institute a turnaround or bankruptcy which is followed by a 
liquidation and sale of a hopelessly insolvent debtor’s property. In case of bankruptcy, 
however, the creditor is entitled to satisfy his requirements almost to the last which 
makes the formal procedure meaningless. 
Of course, the arrears problem has a systemic nature and may be resolved by 
complex means that would take into account all related interests. W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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7. The need for a decentralized approach to “bad loans” 
restructuring 
In post-communist countries, three basic approaches were applied to bank reha-
bilitation and bad debt restructuring:  
1.  The centralized approach applied in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Slovenia. 
2. The decentralized approach applied in Poland. 
3. The laissez-faire approach applied in Russia (see D„browski et all 1996:84). 
The centralized approach is usually strongly supported by the World Bank. It 
includes the creation of a separate financial institution such as the Consolidation Bank 
(in the Czech Republic) or the Rehabilitation Bank (in Kazakstan). The first main 
target of such an institution is to take a certain portion of the bad credits from the 
commercial banks and thus, on one hand, help clean the bank balances, and on the 
other, create acceptable conditions for debtors.  
For example, in Czechia the Consolidation Bank took over a 110 billion crown 
debt (80 per cent of all non-performing loans of state-owned firms and 50 per cent of 
the cooperative firms). This amount represented about 15.7 per cent of all loans in the 
economy. The main resources for covering the transferred non-performing loans were 
long-term facilities from the central bank (bonds and long term loans). The advantages 
and disadvantages of this approach are presented in Table 8. 
In Kazakstan, due to the establishment of the Rehabilitation Bank, it seems that 
the centralized approached is pursued. 
In the decentralized approach, the main responsibility for bad loan 
restructuring is placed with the commercial banks. These banks are responsible for 
separation of loans classified as substandard or non-performing, and creation of new 
organizational units, workout departments, to manage the bad loan portfolio. 
In the framework of this approach implemented in Poland, the Ministry of 
Finance provides the funds for the capitalization of commercial banks. These funds 
allow the banks to create loan-loss provisions ￿ 100 per cent for loss category loans, 
50 per cent for doubtful category loans, and 20 per cent for substandard category 
loans. The recapitalization amount is calculated on the ex ante basis and is set at a 
level sufficient to ensure that upon creating necessary provisions, the banks will reach 
12 per cent capital adequacy ratio, according to Basel standards. (Bank’s equity cannot 
be less than 12 per cent of the extended loans total amount.)  
Under this approach, known from Poland, the government capitalizes banks with 
15-year redeemable treasury bonds denominated in local currency and bearing an 
interest rate close to market rates. From the time of privatization of a recapitalized 
bank, the cost of further servicing and redemption of the bonds transferred to the bank 
are to be refinanced to the State Treasury from the Bank Privatization Fund. 
Within the laissez-faire approach, no action on the part of the government is re-
quired. Due to inflation, a deep erosion of the banking sector assets and capital takes 
place, and thus old bad debts virtually disappear. This situation in its classic form 
appeared in Russia in 1992-1994. A very liberal licensing policy resulted in the rapid 
creation of a huge number of new banks, many being spin-offs of the old state banks. The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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Old banks with bad loans were dissolved, and new commercial banks emerged that 
were not burdened by old loans and old management practices. More than two thou-
sand of the new small entrepreneurial banks have been created in Russia. The new 
banks operate mostly on a regional (oblast) basis with the larger banks handling inter-
national transactions for the regional banks. The natural selection process of the banks 
that survive the competition continues.  
The comparison of all three approaches (see Table 6) demonstrates that the 
decentralized approach is the most effective one. Polish experience confirms it. During 
the last two and a half years (from March 1993 to December 1995) the share of the 
bad loans in the Polish economy declined from 37 per cent to 12 per cent, and the 
problem of inter-firm arrears practically does not exist anymore. 
Also, this approach has other advantages: 
￿  it introduces a mechanism that urges banks to undertake active measures 
against bad borrowers; 
￿ it trains bank staff to do credit risk assessment, to deal with bad borrowers, and 
to be responsible for their own actions; 
￿ since the amount of money for capitalization is determined in advance and does 
not depend upon the total bad loans due to a particular bank, it provides banks with an 
incentive to try to recover as much bad debt as possible; 
￿ it establishes clear rules for all payers, and reduces the threat of political pres-
sure; 
￿ indirectly, it helps the companies with excessive bad debt and does not require 
setting up of a state agency to deal with such indebtedness. 
The authors of this report recommend the introduction of the Banks and 
Enterprises Restructuring Program (BERP) (Programma 1996). This Program assumes 
to resolve radically the bad debts problem of the state-owned enterprises through reha-
bilitation of the banks’ credit portfolios and management of these non-performing 
assets. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to stop the process of transferring 
the burden from the industrial sector to the financial system and from the financial 
system to the macroeconomic environment. Also, it is necessary to partially 
recapitalize the banking system and develop a modern clearing and settlement system. 
Implementation of these tasks should lead to risk reduction and an increase in the 
public’s confidence in the national financial institutions. 
The proposed program consists of two levels, macroeconomic and mi-
croeconomic. The macroeconomic level addresses the relations between the National 
Bank and commercial banks as well as the banks’ recapitalization. The microeconomic 
addresses the problems of certain enterprises’ bad debt to the banks. 
The two levels of the program must be parallel. The banks’ recapitalization at the 
macro level without intensive portfolio restructuring at the micro level will lead to the 
program’s failure. Focusing exclusively on bad loan restructuring at the micro-level 
without legislative and capitalization measures at the macro level will also lead to 
negative effects. These two levels cannot be separated.  
In our opinion, the recapitalization of the largest banks where the state owns the 
largest share of joint stock is necessary. It is unrealistic to expect that the majority of 
banks suffering from equity deficit can manage to acquire adequate equity without 
governmental assistance. The Ministry of Finance must accomplish capital increase W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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(recapitalization) in order to create reserves to cover long-term losses on loans. 
Recapitalization must be paid in the form of treasury bonds transferred to commercial 
banks in 1997. Specific approaches by the National Bank to certain banks suffering 
from capital deficit should be determined in accordance with the charter capital of the 
latter and the state share in this capital. 
Implementation of the BERP in Kazakstan, in our opinion, will require adoption 
of the Law on Financial Restructuring of Banks and Enterprises in the form of lex spe-
cialis, which should include certain requirements: 
￿ define the steps of bad loan restructuring to be undertaken by the commercial 
banks; 
￿ allow a bank to initiate the conciliation procedure when its outstanding claims 
to the enterprise amount to no less than USD 40 thousand or no less than 20 per cent 
of the enterprise’s overall debt; 
￿ introduce a provision under which conciliation agreements become binding for 
all creditors if signed by creditors holding a total of at least 50 per cent of the enter-
prise’s debt; 
￿ allow banks to convert loans into equity (shares of indebted firms) and hold it 
for a limited time (two years) in their portfolios. This practice is still prohibited by the 
banking law of the Republic of Kazakstan; 
￿ allow for bad debts sale; 
￿ draft appropriate laws on bills of exchange and a market for bed debts. 
In order to improve the banking system operation in Kazakstan, it is also neces-
sary to create a national system for collecting and keeping information on borrowers 
and creditors. Such a system would reduce the probability of new bad loans in the 
banking system through increasing borrowers’ responsibility for repayment of loans 
and credits and creating an informational basis for a more sound policy for the banking 
structures themselves. 
8. Privatization of banks 
The Republic of Kazakstan is continuing privatization of second tier commercial 
banks whose founders and shareholders are state-owned enterprises and enterprises 
with a majority state interest.  
There are a number of reasons for privatization of the banking sector. At present 
in the transitional economy, state property and monopolization prevail which hampers 
the development of a healthy competition. Distribution of financial resources still is 
made in an administrative way. Since a network of large competitive commercial 
banks is lacking in Kazakstan, the majority of existing banks provide a very limited set 
(no more than 20) of services, although in developed market economy countries banks 
offer their clients between 300 and 500 different kinds of services. Besides, charter 
capital of commercial banks existing in Kazakstan is so small that they are unable to 
compete with large specialized banks.  
Privatization of the commercial banks aims also at strengthening their financial 
stability and preventing uncontrollable watering down of the state share of their The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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charter capital. One of the documents regulating the process defines the list of banks 
subject to privatization (Postanovlenie 20.03.95). 
Initially, all the larger banks were directly or indirectly owned by the state. Their 
shareholders were almost exclusively state owned enterprises or government agencies. 
As the state owned enterprises that are their main shareholders are corporatized and 
privatized, banks are also privatized. 
Almost all banks are joint stock companies and have been created within the last 
four years. About 30 banks, including most of the larger banks, are spin-offs of the 
former Soviet specialized banks. The remaining 100 banks (zero-banks) were created 
from the ground up by their shareholders after 1991. 
The ownership structure of these two groups is very different. Ownership in most 
zero-banks tends to be concentrated, with some banks owned by only a few sharehold-
ers. Large banks are often owned by a hundred or thousand shareholders. 
In many banks (eleven banks) the formal state share has never been clearly de-
fined, because many banks carried out additional (a second or third) emissions of new 
shares. For example, the Tsvetmet Bank has already made the fourth emission of 
shares. 
Banks’ privatization is taking place through auctions organized by the State 
Committee for Privatization (GKP). The first auctions for sale of state stock in com-
mercial banks were held in the Central Asian Stock Exchange. The sale was organized 
by the GKP in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance.  
In mid-April 1995 the State Committee for Privatization committed the stock of 
46 banks to sale including four banks where the state had controlling stock: Gazprom, 
Torg, Tsvetmet, and Ak-Zhol. Shares of twenty banks were sold through auctions and 
the stock exchange; the most prominent of them is the Agroprom Bank. In August 
1995 the government sold the remaining state shares of two large banks, Turan Bank 
and Credsoc Bank (see Table 6). Also, the licenses of 19 banks with state participation 
were revoked. All the above measures reduced the number of banks with state 
participation from 90 in early 1995 to 49 by February 1996 (Jermakowicz, 
Nikitinskaja, Pańk￿w 1996:211). 
The role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in these transactions is as 
yet minimal. Analysis of some banks’ emission prospectuses shows that the latter are 
of very formal nature. The prospectuses include only financial reports approved by 
local auditing companies and lists of Supervisory and Executive Board members with 
information on their financial participation in the bank’s charter capital. There is no 
information on marketing strategies, on the banks’ structure, their strengths and weak-
nesses, opportunities and threats, etc. The standards for preparation of prospectuses 
established by the Securities and Exchange Commission are not satisfactory for an 
operational full-fledged financial market.  
In our opinion, before the end of 1996, privatization of all banks should be com-
pleted except of those seven to ten banks whose licenses were revoked. As for the 
banks that are not committed to privatization in 1996, the state should appoint into 
their Supervisory Boards not only representatives of different agencies but 
independent professionals as well.  W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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9. Banking laws: Anglo-American or Continental model of 
financial system 
There are two basic models of financial systems which provide for different 
functions of banks and capital markets: Anglo-American (A-A) which includes the 
US, Great Britain, most Latin American countries, and the Continental covering 
Germany, Japan, and the majority of the European countries. 
In the Anglo-American model, equity financing prevails. It provides for separa-
tion of the typical banking activities (deposit-taking and extending commercial credits) 
from typical capital market operations (security issues, secondary markets, etc.). In 
other words, it provides division into deposit banks and investment banks. Also, banks 
are not allowed to hold control over corporations. 
The model is characterized by one-tier corporate governance (boards of directors 
with executive and non-executive members) and, because of the strong dispersion of 
shares, lack of shareholders’ strict control over boards of directors. 
The main strengths of this model are its rational credit policy due to lack of con-
nected and in-house financing and its clear institutional distinction between different 
banking activities which provides for better specialization and concentration.  
The main weaknesses are the lack of borrowers’ control and the banks’ inability 
to influence bad debtors. 
In the Continental model, credit financing prevails. In this model universal 
banks dominate. Banks engage in deposit-taking and in the extension of commercial 
credits as well as in underwriting and the brokerage of securities and other capital 
market transactions. 
The Continental model includes the two-tier corporate governance system 
(supervisory boards and executive boards) and strong direct control by main 
shareholders over banks’ executive boards. Moreover, banks are allowed to control 
corporations. This model is prominent for its strong connection between banks and 
firms which facilitates banks’ control over companies. Banks are in a position, as 
shareholders and creditors, to monitor a firm’s management through direct access to 
information, and they can interfere when necessary to prevent failure.  
The main weaknesses of this model relate to the fact that close bank-firm ties 
may be a source of resources allocation inefficiency and excessive risk-taking. 
There is no doubt that the National Bank of Kazakstan adopted the Anglo-
American model. The separation of depository banks from investment banks and 
inability of these first to make an equity investment are some examples of this 
decision. In our opinion, however, Kazakstan should choose the Continental model 
because of Kazakstan’s lack of developed capital markets and the extremely large role 
of its banks in the transformation process. The Kazakstani banking system, regardless 
of weaknesses, has developed an institutional basis, organizational structures, and 
capital and human resources. The very short time necessary for creation of an effective 
capital allocation mechanism also supports the choice of the Continental model. We 
should also remember that the Continental model played a very positive role in the 
rebuilding of many economies after the Second World War (Germany, Japan, Austria). The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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These factors, in our opinion, determine that the second, continental model 
should be adopted in Kazakstan. Banking system reform cannot be postponed until the 
capital market reaches Western standards and the capital market replaces banks in the 
function of capital allocation. Banking system reform has to be intensified to secure 
financing for economic growth. 
Adoption of the Continental Model in Kazakstan will require several changes in 
the existing regulation. First of all, it will be necessary to remove the existing division 
between deposit banks and investment banks. The continental concept of universal 
banks should be adopted. Second, it will be necessary to abolish the principle that 
banks are prohibited, except investment ones, to participate in charter capitals of legal 
entities and that banks cannot directly influence forms and methods of enterprises’ 
management through buy-outs of the majority stock. Third, it will be necessary to 
adopt a decentralized approach in the bad debt restructuring program. 
10. Choice of banking system reform strategy in 
Kazakstan 
Two factors affect the reform strategy choice: speed of reforms and degree of 
this process’s centralization. In order to answer the question of strategy choice, two 
questions are appropriate: 
1.  Should the government of Kazakstan try to attempt a ￿fast-truck￿ type 
comprehensive bank restructuring, or it should pursue a gradual approach? 
2. Should the government of Kazakstan pursue a regulated or deregulated type of 
banking system reform? 
Different countries have used different strategies (see Table 7). For instance, 
state regulation and a gradual approach were chosen by Far East countries like South 
Korea and Taiwan. The deregulated fast-truck restructuring approach was adopted in 
some Latin American countries and Russia.  
Some countries’ experience shows that countries with strong government regula-
tion like South Korea and Taiwan were successful. The governments in these countries 
intervene through control over financial institutions, interest-rate management, and the 
allocation of credits. In Korea, for example, interest rates were deregulated in 1994 
and deposit rates will not be fully deregulated until 1997. 
Other countries’ experiences prove that countries which introduced the ￿fast 
truck￿ deregulation strategy with a limited role for the government as in Latin America 
and Russia were unsuccessful. Inadequate prudent regulations, severe (latent or mani-
fest) bad loan problems, lack of banking competition, and structural weaknesses in 
savings and investment performance contributed to this failure. 
Which strategy then should be adopted in Kazakstan? 
 There is no doubt that in Kazakstan the two stage approach is necessary. In the 
first stage a gradual, regulated approach should be adopted. In this respect the 
approach accepted by the National Bank and described in Charter 4 should be 
commended. The only problem with this approach is that countries which implement 
this approach are often not in a position to abandon this policy as in South Korea. W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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The second stage should be characterized by a slow movement in a direction of a 
deregulated system. This, however, can be achieved only under certain conditions: 
1. Macroeconomic stability has been achieved. (Financial liberalization, particu-
larly the freeing of interest rates, is hazardous under conditions of great 
macroeconomic imbalances.) 
2. Bank competition is strong enough. This competition can be achieved through 
freeing of interest rates, privatizing government-owned banks, establishing a direct 
securities market, and lifting barriers on new foreign and domestic bank entry. All 
these factors should be developed. 
3. Credit rationing and allocative efficiency problems are removed which means 
the need to exclude and reduce the role of specialized state financial institutions. 
4. Prudential regulation and bank supervision are strengthened. Bad loan prob-
lems and financial crises emerge not because of inadequate supervisory regulations, 
but because the implementation of existing regulations was weak. 
5. A deposit insurance system is introduced that would form the basis for an 
effective banking system. 
This two stage approach should allow for the slow but persistent transformation 
of the Kazakstani banking system. 
11. Conclusions 
Undoubtedly in the 1990s, significant progress was achieved in banking system 
reform in the Republic of Kazakstan. 
First, the two-tier banking system was created to replace the former one-tier one. 
The process was slow since the National Bank was only then being formed as a classic 
central bank, and the first commercial banks were being created on the basis of state 
sector banks. 
Second, the economic instruments of money supply management were 
introduced to the National Bank’s monetary policy. In 1995 the National Bank was 
already using classic monetary and credit tools like credits refinancing, prime rate 
level, mandatory reserves mechanism, state treasury securities, and interventions in the 
currency market. 
Third, the structure of ownership was diversified, i. e. bank privatization had be-
gun. 
Fourth, regulations from international practice were adapted to Kazakstani condi-
tions such as the terms of licensing, the introduction of an adequacy ratio, the 
minimum charter capital, the maximum risk per borrower (related and unrelated), the 
liquidity ratio, the open currency position limit, and reserve requirements. 
Fifth, the role of bank supervision was strengthened and it began to control the 
banks’ operation. Compliance or non-compliance with the standards is the major crite-
ria for a bank’s activities evaluation. During the period from 1993 to 1995, licenses for 
banking transactions were revoked from 80 banks for non-compliance with the 
standard requirements. In the end of 1995, 62 banks were in the process of liquidation, 
but only six were liquidated in fact by the end of 1995. Similar problems exist in The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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Russia where in 1995, 325 banks were to be liquidated, but only six of them really 
ceased to exist. According to the National Bank, recently the liquidation mechanism 
has been refined and does not take so much time. 
Sixth, an interbank loans market and a state securities market have been created 
lately. The amount of secondary transactions on treasury bills was T 11.4 billion com-
pared to T 1.7 billion in 1994. The amount of secondary transactions on short-term 
notes of the National Bank was T 2.2 billion. The state treasury bonds (STB) have 
become very popular. The actual amount of STB in circulation in 1995 increased 24 
times as compared to 1994.  
At the same time, there are serious drawbacks in the banking system of the 
Republic of Kazakstan. The majority of these gaps were described in this paper: 
1. Too many banks and too great concentration in the Almaty Oblast. 
2. Inadequate number of bank branches. 
3. Non-transparent ownership structure. 
4. Low capitalization of banks ￿ only 12 of them comply with the minimum 
charter capital criteria introduced in October 1995. 
5. Low credit activity of banks. 
6. Overly extensive use of centralized loans by the National Bank. 
7. No accepted program to resolve the bad loans problem. 
8. Strong pressure to establish specialized banks. 
9. No deposit insurance system. 
10. Inadequate independence of bank supervision. 
The National Bank of Kazakstan needs further reorganization also. It must stop 
providing bank services to economic entities of the non-financial sector and must 
strengthen the role and the power of the Supervisory Department. W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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Banks in Kazakstan depending upon methods of forming charter capital1 
 










09.94 1    109 72  5  4 1035  191 
10  2    109 69  6  4 1011  190 
11  2    113 65  6  4 1016  190 
12  3    113 65  6  4 1022  191 
01.95 3    110 59  6  6 1042  184 
02  3    110 59  6  6 1042  184 
03  3    106 56  6  6 1038  177 
04  3    102 56  6  6 1047  173 
05  4  1    99  51  6  6  1048  167 
06  4  1    99  51  6  6  1048  167 
07  4  1    96  47  6  6  1050  160 
08  4  1    88  42  6  6  1043  147 
09  3  1    85  40  7  6  1037  142 
10  3  1    84  35  7  6  1029  136 
11  3  1    83  33  7  6  1039  133 
12  3  1    80  33  7  6  1036  130 
 
Source: Authors’ computation based on ￿Statistical Bulletin￿ No. 2, 1996. 
                                                 
1 In Table 1 commercial banks are shown as part of private banks, and joint-stock commercial banks as a 
part of joint-stock banks. The Banking System in Kazakstan 




Data on a number of commercial banks in Kazakstan 
 
  Data on banks   Number  
of banks 
1. Registered  banks  130 
       joint-stock  80 
       private  33 
2.  Number of second tier banks’ branches, total  1036 
       branches of the Agroprom Bank  235 
       branches of the People’s Bank  296 




4.   Number of banks that obtained general licenses  37 
5.  Charter capital of banks (million Tenge)  8662.43 
       banks that obtained domestic licenses  431.89 
       banks that obtained general licenses  6543.69 
6.  Number of banks whose licenses were revoked, total for 1994  33 
       including transformed into branches of other banks  9 
        total for January-August 1995  38 
       including transformed into branches of other banks  9 




       total in 1994  24 
       total for January-August 1995  29 
 




Charter capital and the number of banks 
 
Charter capital,  
million Tenge 
1.09.1995 1.01.1998 
Up to 1  20  18 
From 1 to 5  30  27 
From 5 to 10  10  8 
From 10 to 15  4  3 
From 15 to 20  10  9 
From 20 to 25  2  5 
From 25 to 30  6  3 
From 30 to 80  18  17 
From 80 to 130  19  21 
Over 130  14  16 
 
Source: ￿Statistical Bulletin￿ No. 6(7), 11(12), 1995. 
 
 W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
CASE Foundation 34 
 
Table 4 











Jan. 1, 1995 
Credits 
issued on 
Jan. 1, 1996 
1. Credits provided according to the 
governments decree on ￿The Republican 
Budget￿ 
   
a) for covering the Republican budget  







b) direct credits and credits provided ac-  







c) credits for spring agricultural activities  2.3  0.4  1.1 
d) direct credits for wages and salaries    0.5   
e) credits for purchase of grain      4.4 
Total  4.2 20.6 14.3 
2. Credits provided to the commercial banks       
a) through the auctions  0.2  5.3  9.1 
b) interbak loans      3.4 
c) lombard loans      0.2 
d) other credits  2.4  0.8  2.6 
Total 2.6  6.1  15.3 
3. Klientura credits  0.1    0.7 
Total in Tenge  6.9  27.4  30.2 
Total in US Dollars  1.29  0.76  0.49 
 




Phased standards imposed on commercial banks by the National Bank of Kazakstan 
 






Adequacy ratio (risk weighted capital ￿ asset ratio)       0.08 
Adequacy ratio (risk weighted own capital ￿ asset ratio)       0.04 
Exposure to any single borrower  0.50  0.40  0.25 
Exposure to any single connected party  0.25  0.20  0.10 
Percent of provisions have to be established  0.25  0.35  0.40 
Liquidity ratio      0.20 
 
Source: Programma 17.05.96. 
 The Banking System in Kazakstan 
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Table 6 
Banks with state participation subject to sale 
 
Bank Decree  Status 
Credsoc Bank  No. 2/2, of 2 Aug. 1995  sold on 10 Aug. 1995 
Energoinvest  No. 2/3 of 31 Aug. 1995   
Ural Bank  No. 2/4 of 31 Aug. 1995   
Gazprom Bank  No. 2/5 of 31 Aug. 1995   
Turan Bank  No. 2/6 of 6 Sept. 1995  sold on 14 Aug. 19952 
 
Source: Jermakowicz, Nikitinskaja, Paæk￿w, 1996.  
 
Table 7 
Banking system reform strategies 
 
  ￿Fast-truck￿ approach  Gradual approach 
Governmental regulation  Poland  South Korea, Taiwan 
Deregulation  Chile, Russia   x 
 
Table 8 




Decentralized approach  Laissez-faire approach 
Advantages 
• allows for quick 
separation of bad 
debts from a 
bank’s healthy as-
sets. It is assumed 
that the old banks, 




without the old 
burdens; 
• this approach, 
thanks to the con-
centration of bad 
debts in a single 
institution, allows 
for full focus of 
the new institution 
on bad debt 
restructuring.  
• it introduces the mechanism that compels 
the banks to undertake specific actions with 
respect to bad debtors; 
•  this approach teaches the bank’s person-
nel how to assess credit risk, how to deal 
with bad debtors and how to take respon-
sibility for actions; 
• because the amount of the recapitalization 
has to be determined ex ante and not 
depend on the amount of bad loans to be 
recovered by the individual banks, this 
creates incentives for the banks to recover 
as much of the bad debts as possible; 
• this approach sets clear rules of the game 
to all players and eliminates the risk of po-
litical pressures; 
• this approach indirectly helps firms with 
excessive amount of bad loans and does not 
require the establishment of a government 
agency with bad loan working skills. 
• this is the most 
market conforming 
approach and at the 
same time the easiest 
approach to implement. 
It is easy to perform, 
because no action on 
the part of the gov-
ernment is needed, and 
there is no need for 
effective supervision; 
• this is the cheapest 
approach because no re-
capitalization of the 
banks by the govern-
ment is required; 
• the small size of the 
banks eliminates any 
systemic consequences 
of bank failures.  
                                                 
2 The decision about the shares sale was made practically three weeks after the shares were sold. W. Jermakowicz, B. Irishev 
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Table 8 (cont.) 
Different approaches to bad debt restructuring 
 




• it requires the creation of a new agency 
with loan workout skills. It is difficult to 
find the highly skilled specialists for bad 
loan restructuring for the state based 
institution, and there is no guarantee that 
this agency will vigorously and effec-
tively recover bad debt. The creation of a 
new agency does not answer the question 
of what to do with bad debtors and does 
not create an adequate incentive system 
that would insure the institution’s active 
approach toward indebted enterprises; 
• this approach does not teach banks and 
other debtors responsibility for their ac-
tions. It is not sufficient to replace assets 
and management. It requires a change in 
a whole corporate culture of the banking 
system. This does not address the causes 
of the problem which lie primarily in the 
lack of experience and expertise of the 
banks in assessing credit risk in the mar-
ket environment; it does not teach banks’ 
personnel responsible behavior and re-
sponsibility. The danger still exists that 
the bad loan portfolio will re-emerge in 
the near future; 
• the centralized approach does not 
create an adequate incentive system 
within he banks that would insure the 
banks of an active approach toward in-
debted enterprises; 
• most decisions concerning the separa-
tion of the loans, and support given to 
different enterprises is politically based. 
This creates the danger of political pres-
sures on the credit and restructuring pol-
icy toward big debtors. 
• there exists a 
danger that 
banks preoc-
cupied with old 
debts will be 
unable to intro-
duce new stan-







• there exists 
the danger that 
banks will con-
tinue to finance 







• very easy entry into banking 
sector creates an excellent op-
portunity for criminal ele-
ments to control the banking 
system. This is reinforced by 
very weak bank supervision 
and poor enforcement of 
regulations; 
• due to the high inflation not 
only bad loans erode but also 
banks equities reduce signifi-
cantly. (For example the larg-
est Russian banks have an 
equity in the amount of $100-
150 million.) This hampers 
effective large credit financ-
ing, forces the creation of 
banks consortia, reduces the 
banks’ credit potential; 
• because of the government’s 
inaction, there is no enforce-
ment for restructuring of large 
bad debtors. The responsibil-
ity for large firms restructur-
ing stays at the government 
agencies (not in the banks) 
which creates the strong pres-
sure on the government for 
additional subsidies and does 
not create any incentives for 
firms’ restructuring; 
• erosion of banks’ equity and 
banks’ deposits undermines 
the public trust in the banking 
system and undermines the 
normal functioning of the 
economic system.  
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1  4197518 37535  1407777  106000 106000 -1899028  -  125049   -   -   -  783860 2933468 0.27  9788085 0  0 
6 4849658 410  1258093  520485 1550000 508640 0.11  126000  24.8      2781009 4402645 0.63  15188163 1.4  32.1 
7 1485835 40053  298271  150000 150000 441089 0.30  45600  10.3  15178  3.4  170912 942975 0.18  2614777 0  0 
9 9790739 25960  1831856  400000 400000 2082212 0.21    17      -  2672649 8155103 0.33  21840444 0  10 
10 5801016 43918  642025  762515 169873 1988374 0.34  262524  13      -  13441480 23109892 0.58  54862760 100  0 
21  1302446 23831 113188 80199 100000 316877 0.24  69429  21.9 18060  5.7  642865 1477381 0.44 2677950 0  0 
22 730445 35991  177347 120002 120000 326781 0.45  60175  18.4      268468 685831 0.39  1895088 1  0 
48 4956966 67038  670384  127267 127267 1450032 0.29  336213  23.2  14366  9.9  2019558 6575341 0.31  12661721 0  0 
53 3317169 13116  894472  200000 200000 237361 0.07  23320  9.82        28.16  0 
66 14655718 10092  4382540  280180 436000 1778054 0.12  162954  10      -  1685827 5087808 0.33  37418478 51  0 
98 1052324 31257  155589  100471 160000 218538 0.21  34500  15.8  1000  0.5  416152 1094531 0.38  201794    
107 1390631 92489  139153  150000 150000 666544 0.48  48421  7.3  34790  5.2  2445230 3025806 0.81  5196988 0  0 
199 599377 3535  14438  94500 94500 134140 0.22  18611  13.9      1252422 1206382 1.04  5601642 0  65.3 
225 1286060 3554  3554  603500 597000 787731 0.61  163250  20.7      2336638 1795979 1.30  3252646 0  71 
232 3530276 1624  216054 3204583 3000000 3204359 0.91  205000  6.4      379851 335313 1.13  6746277 100  0 
237 261209 2226  2314  95598 95600 200674 0.77  28347  14.1      287026 347521 0.83  839320 0  77.8 
 
K1 = adequacy ratio; K2 =risk ratio per one borrower; K3 =liquidity ratio. 
 
 
 